The Forgotten Alliance: How the Soviet Union Created Israel and Why It Matters Today

The forgotten Soviet role in Israel's creation reveals how a bid to weaken the British Empire ultimately helped created America's closest Middle Eastern ally.

As Russia positions itself between Israel and Iran today, many observers struggle to understand Moscow’s seemingly contradictory policies. Russia maintains a strategic partnership with Iran and has deepened military and economic cooperation in recent years. It has preserved close ties with Syria and increasingly challenged American influence across the Middle East. Yet Moscow has also maintained channels of communication with Israel, periodically offered itself as a mediator between Tel Aviv and Tehran, and has often avoided treating Israel as merely another Western adversary.

To many observers, this may appear contradictory. It is not. The answer lies in one of the most overlooked episodes of 20th century geopolitics when the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the creation of the State of Israel. This remains one of history’s great geopolitical ironies.

Today Israel is widely regarded as America’s closest ally in the Middle East. Yet in 1947 and 1948, Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union was among the strongest supporters of Jewish statehood. Soviet diplomats championed partition at the United Nations and Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia supplied the weapons that helped Israel survive its first war. The USSR became one of the first governments to recognize the new state.

Understanding this forgotten history also reveals a fundamental difference between Soviet (now Russian) and American political systems. In the United States, a robust ecosystem of interest groups, advocacy organizations and lobbying networks emerged over decades, helping shape US-Israel relations. Organizations such as AIPAC became influential participants in a pluralistic democratic system. Whether one views this influence positively or negatively, it became a permanent feature of American politics. Today, groups like AIPAC exert considerable influence across all institutions of the US government.

No equivalent phenomenon could emerge in the Soviet Union. The Soviet state tolerated no autonomous centers of political power. Religious institutions, ethnic organizations, civic associations and lobbying groups existed only insofar as they served Party objectives. Soviet Jews occupied prominent positions throughout government, science, culture and the military, but no independent Jewish political infrastructure capable of influencing state policy could exist outside Communist Party control.

This distinction would prove crucial. For a brief moment, Stalin believed Israel could become a useful geopolitical partner and perhaps even a socialist-oriented state. However, when the creation of Israel generated visible expressions of Jewish identity inside the Soviet Union itself, Moscow’s enthusiasm rapidly turned into suspicion.

The same state that helped create Israel would soon begin dismantling Jewish institutions, arresting prominent Jewish figures and launching the anti-Semitic campaigns that marked Stalin’s final years. The story that follows is therefore not merely the history of Israel's birth. It is a story about great-power rivalry, strategic miscalculation and one of the great geopolitical ironies of the early Cold War.

Zionism as a Weapon Against the British Empire

To understand why Stalin supported partition, one must first understand Britain’s deteriorating position in Palestine after the Second World War.

By 1945, Britain found itself trapped. The British Mandate in Palestine had become increasingly ungovernable. London faced mounting pressure from both Arab and Jewish communities while simultaneously struggling with severe postwar economic exhaustion. Maintaining Britain’s position required tens of thousands of troops and substantial financial resources at a moment when the British Empire was already beginning to contract.

The most immediate challenge came from the Jewish underground organizations. The Haganah, Irgun (Etzel) and Lehi (the Stern Gang) increasingly viewed Britain - not the Arabs - as the primary obstacle to Jewish statehood. Although these organizations differed significantly in ideology and tactics, they all contributed to a broader campaign aimed at making British rule untenable.

The most famous attack occurred on July 22, 1946, when Irgun operatives bombed King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which housed the headquarters of the British administration and military command. Ninety-one people were killed. The attack shocked Britain and demonstrated that the Mandate was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

Throughout 1945–47, Jewish underground groups attacked British military installations, railways, police stations, radar facilities, and infrastructure throughout Palestine. British soldiers were ambushed, kidnapped and occasionally executed. The cumulative effect was not military defeat but political exhaustion.

This development did not escape Moscow’s attention. From Stalin’s perspective, the Zionist movement had become an unwitting instrument against one of Britain’s most important imperial positions in the Middle East. Soviet leaders understood that partition would almost certainly accelerate Britain’s withdrawal and remove a major pillar of British influence from the region.

As historian Arnold Krammer observed in his study of Soviet policy toward partition, Soviet leaders viewed Palestine primarily through the lens of great-power competition rather than ideology. Weakening Britain was the central strategic prize. Stalin likely expected that the British withdrawal from Palestine would have ripple effects throughout the region. Britain still maintained major military positions in Egypt (Suez Canal), Iraq, Jordan (through the Arab Legion) and the Persian Gulf. The thinking was that a British retreat from Palestine could accelerate perceptions of imperial decline elsewhere.

Stalin’s Real Objective: Weakening Britain’s Middle Eastern Order

The clearest public expression of this Soviet policy came from Andrei Gromyko, the Deputy Foreign Minister at the time. Speaking before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine on May 14, 1947, Gromyko delivered what remains one of the most consequential speeches in modern Middle Eastern history. Referring to the Holocaust, he declared:

“The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defense of the elementary rights of the Jewish people and to safeguard it against the violence of fascist executioners explains the aspiration of the Jews to establish their own State.”¹

The statement is often cited as evidence of Soviet sympathy for Jewish statehood. Yet the more consequential aspect of the speech came when Gromyko endorsed partition if Arabs and Jews proved unable to coexist within a single state. This marked a dramatic departure from previous Soviet policy and signaled Moscow’s willingness to support a political solution that would almost certainly hasten Britain’s departure from Palestine.

The Soviet Union subsequently voted in favor of UN Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947. For Moscow, partition was not merely a humanitarian response to Jewish suffering. It was a geopolitical instrument designed to accelerate Britain’s withdrawal from Palestine and weaken British influence throughout the Middle East.

In the short term, Stalin succeeded. Britain abandoned the Mandate and withdrew. In the longer term, however, the strategy produced one of the great ironies of 20th century geopolitics. The state whose creation Moscow helped facilitate ultimately become America’s closest ally in the Middle East.

American Surprise and the Archival Record

The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) archives reveal how surprising Soviet support appeared to American policymakers. Many officials within the US State Department assumed Moscow opposed nationalism outside Communist control. Some feared the Kremlin might ultimately use the new Jewish state as a vehicle for Soviet influence in the region.

The FRUS records show extensive debates inside the Truman administration regarding Soviet intentions. George Kennan and other officials worried that Soviet support for partition reflected a broader effort to expand Moscow’s influence into the Middle East.

In one of history’s great ironies, American officials in 1947 feared that Israel might become a Soviet client state. The reality turned out quite differently.

When Washington Imposed an Arms Embargo and Moscow Supplied Weapons

Diplomatic support alone did not ensure Israel’s survival. In December 1947, the United States imposed an arms embargo on Palestine. While intended to be neutral, the embargo restricted access to weapons for Jewish forces preparing for what increasingly appeared to be an inevitable war.

At precisely this moment, the Soviet bloc stepped forward. Through communist Czechoslovakia, Moscow authorized extensive shipments of rifles, machine guns, artillery, ammunition, and aircraft. According to the scholarship of Gabriel Gorodetsky and archival materials examined by Laurent Rucker at the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), these transfers represented one of the most important external contributions to Israel’s survival during the 1948 war.

Among the most famous deliveries were Avia S-199 fighter aircraft that were imperfect descendants of the German Messerschmitt, but nevertheless proved critical to the fledgling Israeli Air Force. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion would later acknowledge the significance of Czech arms deliveries. Numerous Israeli military historians have concluded that these shipments helped alter the military balance during the crucial early months of the conflict.

This created one of the great ironies of Israel’s founding. While Washington was attempting to prevent escalation through an embargo, Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakia became the principal supplier of weapons to Jewish forces. The result was a situation that would have seemed unimaginable only a few years later. Stalin was arming Israel while the United States was restricting arms shipments.

The Soviet Hope for a Socialist Israel

Moscow’s calculations extended beyond merely expelling Britain. Many Soviet officials believed the new state might evolve in a socialist direction. The dominant currents within Zionism were labor-oriented. The kibbutz system appeared compatible with socialist ideals. Many Israeli leaders originated from Eastern Europe and retained cultural connections to the broader socialist tradition. The Kremlin therefore believed Israel might emerge as either neutral or potentially sympathetic to Soviet interests.

This assumption proved to be one of Stalin’s greatest strategic miscalculations. Israel’s leaders increasingly concluded that their long-term economic and security interests lay with the West. However, before that shift became fully apparent, an extraordinary event in Moscow transformed Stalin’s perception of Israel and Soviet Jewry.

Golda Meir and the Synagogue That Alarmed Stalin

In September 1948, Golda Meir arrived in Moscow as Israel’s first ambassador. What followed shocked Soviet authorities. On October 3, during Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur celebrations, tens of thousands of Soviet Jews gathered around Moscow’s Choral Synagogue to greet her, chanting “Nasha Golda” (Our Golda").

In her memoir My Life, Golda Meir recalled:

“I felt as though I had been caught up in a torment of love so strong that it had literally taken my breath away and slowed down my heart.”²

Many accounts estimate the crowd approached 50,000 people. For Soviet Jews, Israel’s creation represented a moment of profound emotional significance. For Stalin, however, the gathering carried a different meaning. The Soviet state demanded absolute loyalty. The spontaneous emergence of a mass public demonstration centered on Jewish identity suggested the existence of loyalties and affiliations beyond Communist Party control.

As Yaacov Ro’i has argued, the event became a turning point in Soviet perceptions of Zionism. Israel was no longer merely a foreign-policy instrument. It had become a potential source of identity and inspiration for Soviet Jews themselves. That realization profoundly disturbed Stalin.

Polina Zhemchuzhina and the End of the Soviet-Israeli Honeymoon

The Golda Meir episode intersected with one of the most remarkable personal dramas within the Soviet leadership. Polina Zhemchuzhina, wife of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, was among the most prominent Jewish women in the Soviet Union. She was often regarded as an unofficial First Lady due to her status within the Soviet elite.

According to memoir accounts and later historical studies, she met Golda Meir during the ambassador’s visit and reportedly conversed with her warmly in Yiddish. Whether every detail of these accounts is fully verifiable remains debated. What is not debated is what followed. Soon afterward, Stalin ordered her arrest. She was expelled from the Communist Party and exiled. Even Molotov could not protect her. Her downfall was among one of several factors that symbolized the rapid collapse of the brief Soviet-Israeli honeymoon.

From Israel to the Doctors’ Plot

By the early 1950s, Stalin’s attitude had changed dramatically. Jewish institutions came under increasing pressure. Members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee were arrested and executed. Campaigns against so-called “rootless cosmopolitans” intensified.

The culmination was the Doctors’ Plot of 1952-53. Historians continue to debate whether Stalin intended broader anti-Jewish measures before his death in March 1953. What is clear is that Israel’s creation, Golda Meir’s reception in Moscow and Stalin’s growing fears regarding Zionism formed part of the political environment that contributed to these campaigns.

The same leader who had helped create Israel now viewed Zionism as a potential threat.

Why This History Matters Today

The Soviet strategy ultimately failed. Britain was expelled from Palestine, but Israel did not become a Soviet partner. Instead, it evolved into America’s closest regional ally. Yet the legacy of this history never disappeared.

More than one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe eventually settled in Israel. Russian remains widely spoken. Economic, cultural, familial and historical ties continue to connect the two countries. This helps explain why Russia’s relationship with Israel has often differed from its relations with other Western-aligned states.

Today, Moscow maintains close ties with Iran, Syria, and numerous Arab governments. It increasingly challenges American policy throughout the region. Yet Russia has consistently sought to preserve communication channels with Israel and often presents itself as a potential mediator.

This is not a contradiction. It reflects a longstanding Russian tradition of viewing the Middle East through the lens of state interests rather than ideological alignments. The origins of that approach can be traced directly to 1947 and 1948, when Stalin made one of the most consequential geopolitical gambles of the twentieth century.

In seeking to expel Britain from the Middle East, he helped create Israel. In hoping to gain a partner, he strengthened the Western camp. In supporting Jewish statehood abroad, he helped awaken fears of Jewish political identity at home that would contribute to some of the darkest episodes of his final years.

Few geopolitical decisions have produced such enduring consequences. The Soviet Union helped create Israel and the echoes of that forgotten decision continue to shape Middle Eastern politics nearly eight decades later.

Kautilya The Contemplator is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, please consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. I will always be grateful for your support.

References

1. Andrei Gromyko, Address to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 14 May 1947.

2. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1947, Volume V: The Near East and Africa.

3. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, Volume V, Part 2: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

4. Golda Meir, My Life (New York: Putnam, 1975).

5. Gabriel Gorodetsky, various studies on Soviet Middle East policy.

6. Yaacov Ro’i, Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1948–1954.

7. Laurent Rucker, Moscow’s Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance, 1947–1949, Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center.

8. Arnold Krammer, “Soviet Motives in the Partition of Palestine, 1947–1948,” Journal of Palestine Studies.

1. Statement by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Representative to the United Nations, before the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Palestine, 14 May 1947.

2. Golda Meir, “My Life”, (New York: Putnam, 1975).