Echoes of Osirak: US Strikes on Iran May Trigger a North Korea-Style Nuclear Breakout

The US bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities may have pushed Tehran onto an irreversible path toward building a nuclear bomb, mirroring North Korea’s defiant strategy after the Osirak precedent.

On June 21, 2025, the United States launched preemptive strikes on Iran’s core nuclear facilities, marking a watershed moment in the expanding US-Israeli war against the country. The operation, aimed at crippling Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities, echoed a similar moment in history in 1981 when Israel attacked Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. That event, while successful in destroying Iraq’s nuclear ambitions, became a powerful lesson for future proliferators. Among them, North Korea adopted a path of concealment, weaponization, and defiance, ultimately testing nuclear weapons and establishing itself as a de facto nuclear power. Now, with its key facilities bombed, Iran may follow the same path.

The Osirak reactor, a French-supplied nuclear facility near Baghdad, was bombed by the Israeli Air Force in 1981 under the belief that Iraq was clandestinely seeking nuclear weapons. The international community condemned the strike, but it delayed Iraq’s nuclear program for years. The attack sent a chilling signal that peaceful or semi-transparent nuclear infrastructure could be eliminated before reaching weaponization. Fast forward to 2025 where the United States, aligning strategically with Israel, bombed Iran’s principal known nuclear sites at Natanz (enrichment), Fordow (deep underground centrifuge installation), and Esfahan (conversion and assembly). The sites represent the backbone of Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle. The strikes were justified as preemptive measures to halt Iran’s path toward a bomb. While the extent of the damage to the facilities will become clear in the coming days, the most significant implication of this attack is that rather than eliminate the program, it may instead reinforce the very rationale for acquiring nuclear weapons - deterrence.

North Korea’s Strategy Post-Osirak and the Yongbyon Model

North Korea learned vital lessons from the Osirak incident. First, it understood that transparency invites vulnerability in that civilian programs under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are not immune from destruction. Second, only operational nuclear weapons deter intervention. Iraq, Libya, and Syria all suffered regime change or external attack after abandoning or failing to develop nuclear arms. Third, concealment and deception are essential. North Korea's nuclear infrastructure was built underground, dispersed, and often declared only when operational.

Between the 1980s and 2006, North Korea moved from peaceful nuclear research to an active, covert nuclear weapons program. It signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in December 1985, only to withdraw in 2003 following US accusations of a secret uranium enrichment program. By 2006, it tested its first bomb. Along the way, Pyongyang mastered the art of using nuclear progress as diplomatic leverage while maintaining tight control over domestic narratives.

Iran’s approach to nuclear development prior to the 2025 strikes differed significantly. Rather than pursue overt weaponization, it maintained a “nuclear hedging” strategy that comprised enriching uranium up to 60 percent under IAEA inspections, insisting on a peaceful program within the NPT framework, and using its program as leverage in negotiations, particularly in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Furthermore, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued religious fatwas declaring nuclear weapons un-Islamic. Yet, technical developments in centrifuge designs, stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and underground fortifications suggested that Iran maintained a latent capacity to break out if necessary. This will now change fundamentally following the US strikes.

The Post-Strike Landscape and Why Iran May Follow the North Korea Model

The US strikes have obliterated Iran’s confidence in the international system. Despite being a party to the NPT, allowing inspections, and not having tested a nuclear weapon, Iran was attacked. This undermines the core logic of compliance in that if transparency does not guarantee security, why abide by the rules? North Korea made this conclusion two decades ago when it withdrew from the NPT. Iran may now follow suit. With much of its enrichment capacity damaged and diplomacy proven futile, Tehran has every reason to pivot toward covert militarization.

North Korea responded to pressure by deepening and hardening its facilities. Iran has already followed a similar approach. Fordow was built 80 meters underground. Following the US strike, Iran will likely accelerate construction of new underground facilities at hardened, unknown locations, prioritizing survivability over transparency. Future efforts may become clandestine. These new sites would likely bypass IAEA inspections altogether, replicating North Korea’s Yongbyon-style model. The latter refers to North Korea’s strategic approach to developing nuclear weapons capabilities through its main nuclear complex located in Yongbyon, about 100 kilometers north of Pyongyang. The term has come to symbolize a broader playbook for nuclear development under conditions of international pressure, limited transparency and maximum political leverage. It informs how countries might delay or deceive IAEA inspections, how a nuclear program could be split across multiple sites to obscure full capacity and how nuclear development might be used as a tool of negotiation and deterrence and not just for military utility.

Like North Korea, Iran may abandon its hedging posture in favor of full-spectrum deterrence. The rationale is now unambiguous. Without the bomb, Iran is vulnerable. With it, regime survival is assured. Moreover, Iran's leadership may reframe its religious and political doctrine to accommodate the need for nuclear weapons. The Supreme Leader's fatwa could be reinterpreted as conditional in that peaceful intent was valid only when reciprocity and respect existed. That illusion has now been shattered.

Even after the strikes, Iran retains nuclear scientists, engineering know-how, and dual-use technology. Rebuilding the program is a matter of time and secrecy, not possibility. JCPOA diplomacy is also now politically dead. Sanctions relief is now impossible without total surrender. Iran is unlikely to repeat the perceived mistake of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Iranians may now rally around a national push for a bomb, framing it as essential for sovereignty.

It should be emphasized that the perception in Tehran is that regime change remains the ultimate goal of both the United States and Israel. Despite public statements focusing on nuclear non-proliferation, the pattern of military interventions from Iraq to Libya reinforces the belief that disarmament or diplomatic compromise only invites eventual overthrow. The ongoing war with Israel, and now America’s entry, signals to Iran's strategic planners that a functioning nuclear arsenal may be the only viable insurance policy against foreign coercion. This belief that regime change, not nonproliferation, is the West's true objective will likely add urgency to Iran's potential nuclear sprint.

Diplomatic Fallout and Broader Geopolitical Implications

Iran’s path from here may mirror North Korea’s in one other important sense: increased diplomatic isolation. North Korea accepted ‘pariah’ status from the West in return for strategic independence and regime survival. Iran, after years of engagement with Europe, China, Russia, and the UN, is on the brink of a similar transformation. However, unlike North Korea, Iran is now a full member of the BRICS bloc, having joined alongside other emerging powers as part of a shift toward a multipolar world order. This development significantly buffers Iran from the full brunt of Western diplomatic isolation. With continued access to Chinese investment, Russian arms, and growing trade with fellow BRICS members such as India and Brazil, Iran can now more confidently defy US and European sanctions.

Military and economic support from China and Russia is expected to deepen in the wake of the strikes, with both powers viewing Iran as a critical ally in counterbalancing US influence in the Middle East. Tehran's inclusion in BRICS also provides new financial tools such as alternative payment systems and currency swap mechanisms to circumvent dollar-dominated economic pressure. This strategic alignment gives Iran the confidence that it will not be completely isolated even as it distances itself from Western institutions.

If Tehran formally withdraws from the NPT, ends cooperation with the IAEA, and refuses diplomacy until it has established nuclear deterrence, the global non-proliferation regime will suffer a catastrophic blow. States like Saudi Arabia and Turkiye may be prompted to seek their own deterrents, triggering a cascade of proliferation across the Middle East.

The bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities may go down in history not as the moment Iran’s nuclear program was destroyed, but the moment it became inevitable. North Korea’s post-Osirak playbook of concealment, weaponization, and defiant withdrawal from international agreements offers Tehran a proven, if perilous, path. With trust shattered, diplomacy failed, infrastructure damaged, and regime change perceived as the ultimate Western objective, Iran now has every incentive to do what North Korea did and build the bomb, not as a threat, but as the only guarantee of survival. Furthermore, like North Korea, it may succeed, not in avoiding international wrath, but in ensuring that it is never again attacked with impunity. The question now is not whether Iran will pursue nuclear weapons but how quickly, how secretly, and how decisively it can accomplish the task before the world even knows that the Iranian bomb has arrived.

Citations

1. Perkovich, George. "Iraq's Nuclear Timeline." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2003.

2. Hecker, Siegfried. "A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex." Stanford CISAC. 2010.

3. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "Update on Iran’s Nuclear Program." 2024.

4. David Albright and Mark Hibbs. "Iran’s Accelerating Nuclear Timetable." Institute for Science and International Security. 2022.

5. Davenport, Kelsey. "Iranian Nuclear Program: Proposals and Status." Arms Control Association. 2023.